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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: CONTROL
OF "DECEPTIVE PROGRAMMING"
INTRODUCTION
In recent months the field of television broadcasting has been the
subject of investigation conducted by the Special Subcommittee on Legis-
lative Oversight of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce.' Specifically focusing on certain "deceptive" broadcasting
practices first brought to light by disclosures of program contestants,2 the
congressional subcommittee's investigation evoked testimony to the effect
that the once-popular television quiz shows were in many instances "rigged"
by the producers and others,3 with the apparent purpose of creating and
maintaining a high level of audience appeal. Assisted by this rigging-
accomplished by various arrangements between producers and contestants
in which the favored contestants were furnished answers before broadcast
time or asked questions which the producers were certain they could answer
-such shows as Twenty-One and $64,000 Question were able to capture
and retain a vast segment of the American television audience.4
In the wake of the revelations of the subcommittee's investigations,
there have arisen questions relating to the extent of the Federal Communi-
cation Commission's authority to control and inhibit what has been tagged
"program deception." Former FCC Chairman John C. Doerfer denied the
agency's authority under existing legislation to move against the practice,5
while the Attorney General of the United States expressed the sharply con-
trary view that the Commission is currently competent to regulate "program
deception" by means of review of a broadcaster's past performance in
'The hearings were commenced on October 6, 1959, at which time the subcom-
mittee heard the statements of two former contentants on the show Twenty-One to
the effect that they had been furnished answers to questions during the course of their
association with the program. N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1959, p. 1, col. 3.
2 See Time, Sept. 1, 1958, p. 38; Time, Sept. 8, 1958, p. 43; Time, Sept. 15, 1958,
p. 47.
3 See Life, Nov. 16, 1959, p. 30; Time, Nov. 16, 1959, pp. 72-74; N.Y. Times,
Oct. 10, 1959, p. 1, col. 4. There has also been considerable testimony related to
so-called "Payola," but this aspect of the investigations is not within the scope of
this Note.
4 The program $64,000 Question, for example, within four weeks of its introduc-
tion had acquired an audience larger than any other network program. Welch, The
Quiz Program: A Network Staple, 2 3. BROADCASTING 311 (1958).
5 Doerfer took the position that his agency was without authority to act with
respect to "deceptive programming" on the theory that the deception was not a "legal
deception." In his view the FCC could act only when a program practice was pro-
hibited by a specific law, such as the prohibition against broadcasting of lotteries
(18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1958)). See U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 26, 1959, p. 46.
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license renewal proceedings. 6 Both the congressional committee 7 and the
FCC 8 have issued proposals for legislation intended to clarify the Com-
mission's power in this regard and to provide a basis for effective govern-
ment control of deceptive broadcasting, and it seems likely that such legis-
lation will be forthcoming. The purpose of this Note is to inquire into
the nature of the revealed broadcasting practices, into the propriety of their
regulation, and into some of the problems which may be encountered in
pursuing the alternative regulatory methods suggested.
WHAT Is "DECEPTIVE PROGRAMMING"?
The phrase "deceptive programming," apparently coined during the
course of the investigations, has become a catchword to describe much of
the revealed activity which the investigators and onlookers have regarded
as offensive. As an acceptable characterization of the range of practices
whose control is being considered, however, it appears too broad a term.9
In essence, what has become the focus of concern is a series of quiz shows
which appeared to offer entertainment through the spectacle of unrehearsed
contestants attempting to answer questions in an actual contest of skill and
knowledge, vying for money prizes in amounts theretofore unheard of as
quiz program rewards. In fact, because in many instances those con-
testants were "tipped off," no real tests of knowledge were involved and
the audience, contrary to its belief and expectation, was witnessing pro-
grams more in the nature of dramatizations than contests.Y0 The phrase
"program deception," then, refers in its immediate context to presentations
which purport to show the uncontrolled responses of individuals whose
responses have in reality been measured and controlled in advance, usually
with their collusion, by the producers of the presentation, in a manner not
within the contemplation of the audience. The difficulty in distinguishing
this class of phenomena from varieties of entertainment which our culture
generally regards as unobjectionable-professional wrestling bouts, pre-
rehearsed "candid" interviews, the planted comic stooge in the audience-
is apparent, and the initial problem of regulation must be to derive a concept
of the evil resident in the quiz-show situation which, while not strictly
limited to quiz shows (their return to popularity in the near future being
6AT'ry GEN., RP. ON DECEPTIVE PRACTICES IN BROADCASTING MEDIA (1959), in
N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1960, p. 10, 11, col. 7. See also Lewis, Television and the F.C.C.,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1959, p. 7, col. 7.
7 N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1960, p. 62, col. 1. See text accompanying notes 119-22
infra.
sWall Street J., Feb. 5, 1960, p. 2, col. 3. See text accompanying notes 111-13
infra.
9 Numerous practices involved in the production of a television broadcast could
conceivably fall within a broad interpretation of "deceptive programming." Previously
arranged interview and panel discussion programs, "canned laughter" and the use
of teleprompters are staging devices of which the audience may be unaware, but
which, nevertheless, may be acceptable.
10 For a description of the behind-the-scenes practices involved in quiz show
"rigging,' see Life, Nov. 16, 1959, p. 30.
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unlikely), does not carry over to performances whose pre-broadcast prepa-
ration does not involve the same evil. Definitional difficulties are enhanced
by the large factor of subjectivity which enters into the question: probably
the crucial focus of distinction is not whether a spectator is led to believe
that which is not objectively true, but whether the whole atmosphere which
surrounds the presentation is such as to detach him, at some level of
consciousness, from regarding as important that he know the objective
truth. The matter is largely one of audience expectation-not expectation
as to fact, but as to its own relationship to fact. Precise delineation of the
activities involved is the first obstacle in the path of any attempt to control
"deception" in the communication of entertainment, 1 since the problem of
definitions underlies not only the administration of an effective scheme of
control but also the fundamental policy decisions as to what, whether and
how to regulate.
Part of the problem lies in isolating the element of harm sought to be
remedied and the affected interests sought to be protected. Moral revulsion
at the notion that the public has been "deceived" tends to obscure analysis
of the issues. Why should "deceived" rather than "entertained" be the
label attached? Certainly the television audience was fooled by the quiz
shows. But, at the time, it enjoyed them. It devoted its time to watching
programs to which, had the truth of rigging then been made public, it
would likely have given little attention. But, precisely because the rigging
was not then known, the audience got its full evening's enjoyment (and
subsequently, of course, it was to get the excitement of revelation and
scandal). What was there about the way in which the audience spent its
evenings which justifies intervention by the controlling force of a public
agency?
Demonstrably, also, the viewers of the rigged programs were induced
to purchase their sponsors' products ' 2---perhaps simply by the favorable
association of program and product,'3 or perhaps because, once having had
11 See generally Gould, Quiz For TV: How Much Fakery?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25,
1959, § 6 (Magazine), p. 13. One apt attempt to characterize the situation is that
"what is going on is not visible and what is visible is not going on." Drummond,
Herald Tribune (New York), Oct. 21, 1959, p. 25, col. 1.
32 Indicative of the advertising success of quiz show sponsors is the growth in
sales of Revlon, Inc., sponsor of $64,000 Question and $64,000 Challenge. In 1954,
Revlon's net sales were $33,604,000; but at the conclusion of 1958, this figure had
increased to $110,363,000. Similarly, net sales of Pharmaceuticals, Inc., sponsor of
Twenty-One, climbed from $20,000,000 in 1956 to $30,000,000 in 1957. ATT'Y GEN.,
REP. ON DECEPTIVE PRACTICES IN BROADCASTING MEDIA (1959), in N.Y. Times, Jan. 1,
1960, p. 10, 11, col. 2.
13 The efficacy of television as an advertising medium has been attested to.
"[T]elevision brings to us in one combination the information of the printed word,
the immediacy of radio, the fluidity of motion pictures, the actuality of the theatre,
and, most important of all, the intimacy of the living room." GELLER, ADVERTISING
AT THE CROSSROADS 49 (1952). Not only is TV a highly persuasive advertising
medium, it is also the most extensive in its coverage. The potential selling value to
the advertiser of a single network broadcast is illustrated by the fact that in 1958
there were 665 commercial television stations in the United States, the majority of
which were network affiliated. See also note 120 infra. Of all homes in the United
States, 83% had a television set, and 90% of the population was within the range
of at least one of these stations. 24 FCC ANN. REP. 4 (1958).
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their attention directed to the product, they found it intrinsically desirable
and preferable to its commercial rivals. If the product was inherently
preferable (a largely subjective matter, of course), it is difficult to see how
its buyer has been hurt; if not, and the sales boom is a merely Pavlovian
reaction, the "injured" public will presumably vindicate its own wrongs
at the merchandise counter soon after the disillusioning revelation, and
no more severe government regulatory mechanism than, perhaps, one of
investigation and disclosure need be supported. In any event, inasmuch as
the deception in question did not involve the quality or nature of the
product, 14 the viewers as consumers will have received their money's worth
in value of goods,' 5 and any advertising costs included in the price will
probably be no higher on account of the deception than the costs of some
equally vigorous if less guileful promotion scheme.
But while it is difficult to find injury to the listening and viewing public
as consumers of the advertised products, it is nevertheless arguable that
injury has been inflicted upon merchandising or advertising competitors of
the rigged quiz shows' sponsors. 16 To the extent that any such injury
may be attributed to "deceptive programming," the problem may admit of
analysis in terms of unfair competition-the FTC's bailiwick.' 7  Before
accepting unfair competition as a justification for control, however, the
actual role of the rigging qua rigging in the competitive struggle must be
isolated. The "deception" in this context does not impair the ability of
buyers to discriminate among competing products on the products' merits,
as would misleading representations of product worth. What it does do is
14 During the course of the congressional hearings, commercial messages them-
selves have come under attack by various critics of industry practices. See, e.g.,
Anderson, Washington Merry-Go-Round, The Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), Nov.
3, 1959, p. 76, col. 5. It is not the purpose of this Note, however, to consider directly
questions of FCC control over advertising abuses.
15 Cf. Caples Co. v. United States, 243 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1957), where it was
held that listeners who were required to enter stores where sponsors' products were
sold in order to obtain cards with which to play a broadcast game-Play Marko-
did not thereby furnish consideration to make the broadcast a lottery.
16 Cf. ATT'Y GEN., REP. ox DECEPTIvE PRACTICES IN BROADCASTING MEDIA (1959),
in N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1960, p. 10, 11, col. 2: "Within a month after Revlon started
the $64,000 Question, the company's closest rival, Hazel Bishop, fell far behind."
17 Action by sponsors which can be tagged an "unfair method of competition"
would make the sponsors subject to action by the Federal Trade Commission. 38
Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958) : "Whenever the Commission
has reason to believe that any . . . corporation has been or is using any unfair
method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce . . . it
shall serve upon such . . . corporation a complaint. . . ." FTC action against
the broadcasters is limited, however, by 52 Stat. 116 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §54(b)
(1958), which exempts media of communications from FTC jurisdiction over the
dissemination of false advertising: "No publisher, radio-broadcast licensee, or agency
or medium for the dissemination of advertising, except the manufacturer . . . or
seller of the commodity to which the false advertisement relates, shall be liable under
this section by reason of the dissemination by him of any false advertisement . .. ."
Insofar as the "deception!' involved is in the program itself rather than the adver-
tising, however, it is arguable that such "deceptive programming" as affects intra-
communications competition will subject broadcasters to FTC jurisdiction for the
use of a "deceptive act or practice in commerce."
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to present a sponsor's wares to consumers in a favorable--"deceptively"
created--conjunction, something like loss-leader selling practices. Cer-
tainly the relative values of the products offered and the effects of non-
deceptive elements of the total sales campaigns are factors which contribute
to one seller's success over others and may have determinative impact even
where the successful seller also engages in "deception."
More immediate, but presenting somewhat the same range of con-
siderations, is the effect of deceptive programming upon intra-communica-
tions competition. As between broadcasting stations, and especially as
between networks, the quiz shows attracted audiences at the expense of
rivals. The value of air-time contiguous to the popular rigged shows was
enhanced, fortifying the demand power of the rigging broadcasters. But
some members of the industry have defended the shows as merely good
entertainment,'8 and to the extent that communications business is enter-
tainment business, it seems clear that the public was given superior mer-
chandise-with deception as a component of the article of competition. In
this framework, where the "deceptive" element may be regarded less as a
factor extraneously affecting the buyer's power to choose and more as an
integral element of the good chosen, to attach the label of "unfairness"-in-
competition must necessarily involve resort to preconceptions of what is
"fair" which derive from sources outside the competitive situation itself.
Ultimately, then, if there has been any substantial public harm in
program deception it must be found in the moral sphere.'9 A lessening of
the popular faith in the integrity of the broadcasting industry has no doubt
occurred. Yet it might be argued that, to the extent that disclosure has
made the mass communications audience aware of the possibilities of such
practices as rigging, the experience will have bred a more critical perspective
which will decrease the frequency-and the success-of such attempts in
the future. Far more important, however, is the impact which the quiz-
show revelations may have upon the ethical climate and moral attitudes of
the culture. An image of rectitude which was an available focus for common
identification has been shaken. The realization that college instructors and
ministers, among others, can be induced to accept the answers in advance
in return for financial gain may have a significant impact on accepted
standards of honesty, especially in the case of children whose values have
not yet formed.20 How does one explain to a school child that cheating
on examinations is improper when he discovers that people who had
supposedly accuxmulated considerable knowledge and won acclaim among
adults were really "cheating" in their "examinations"? This kind of
damage is one which disclosure alone cannot cure but rather precipitates,
I8 See Life, Oct. 26, 1959, p. 38 (editorial) ; Time, Sept 1, 1958, p. 38.
19 The moral implications are referred to in the interim report of the Subcom-
mittee On Legislative Oversight. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1960, p. 62, col. 1. See also
Morgenthau, Reaction to the Van Doren Reaction, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1959, § 6
(Magazine), p. 17.
20 See Life, Oct. 26, 1959, p. 34.
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and it is not unreasonable to regard the harm as of a magnitude sufficient
to justify legislative concern.2 1  Yet regulation of private action whose
impact is mainly ideological has traditionally been regarded with suspicion
under this country's federal constitution.22 At best, the wisdom of under-
taking any such regulation is doubtful. Once the decision to undertake it
has been made, the means to be employed remain a matter of extreme
delicacy.
THE ComIuNIcATIoNs ACT OF 1934: CONTROL AND
LIMITATIONS ON CONTROL
Evaluation of any method of deceptive programming control necessarily
involves an inquiry into the permissible scope of governmental regulation
of broadcasting in terms of the first amendment. Fundamental to this
inquiry is the recognition that the wireless communications media present
an absolutely unique situation in the dimension of free speech, a situation as
to which the full implications of the constitutional guarantee have yet to
be faced by the Supreme Court. Unlike other modes of expression, broad-
casting is subject to the extreme physical limitations of the restricted
broadcast frequency spectrum, and to prevent a chaos of electrical inter-
ference amidst which no expression at all could be communicated, airwaves
and airtime must be allocated to selected individuals.2 In this posture of
facts, the question as to whether there shall be public regulation is an issue
foreclosed by necessity.24 The problem is what kind of regulation.
21See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), sustaining a state statute
forbidding children to sell papers in a public place as applied to the guardian of a
child who distributed religious literature on the streets. While it might be reasoned
that the welfare of children is traditionally a state, not a federal concern (compare
the opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503-07
(1957) (dissent)), clearly effective control over broadcasting can only be achieved
at the federal level.
2 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); West Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
23 See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Note, 57 YALE L.J. 275
(1947). The first premise of federal communications regulation has always been
recognized as residing in the absolute physical necessity for some sort of allocation
of ranges, times and frequencies among broadcasters so as to keep them from shrieking
one another off the air by mutual interference. See ZOLLMAN, LAW OF THE AIR
§§ 165, 166, 169 (1927) ; Davis, The Radio Act of 1927, 13 VA. L. REv. 611 (1927) ;
Huntley, Growing Pains in Broadcast Regulation, 14 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 186, 187
(1957); Note, 36 VA. L. REv. 232, 235-36 (1950); 27 COLUM. L. REv. 726, 727
(1927). See also WARNza, RADIO AND TE.EviSION LAw 766 n.25 (1948), quoting
HEMaNG & GRoss, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 244 (1936). For one instance of judicial
recognition of the importance of the noninterference consideration, see FCC v. NBC
319 U.S. 239 (1943) (the KOA case).
2 4 Alternatively, it would be theoretically possible to keep "broadcasters out of
each other's 'hair in the air'" (Hearings on S. 1648 Before a Subcommittee of Senate
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1955) (views of
former Commissioner Doerfer)) by recognizing a private property right in broadcast
frequencies and offering legal protection of that right. This is a solution funda-
mentally rejected by Congress. The first section of the radio subchapter of the
Communications Act of 1934 declares: "It is the purpose of this chapter . . .to
maintain the control of the United States over all channels of interstate and foreign
radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership
1960]
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License Allocation: the Power to Select
Under the scheme initially fixed upon by Congress during the years
after World War I when the commercial broadcasting industry experienced
an unrestrained and rapid growth,25 the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (created by the Communications Act of 193426 as successor to the
Federal Radio Commission) is the agency charged with the task of limiting
entry into the wireless communications field by the allocation of commercial
broadcast licenses. In the exercise of this regulatory function, the FCC
had to be given some criterion for selection among would-be-broadcasters
in the frequent situation where more than one applicant desired a single
available frequency, and insofar as its power to select was put into practice,
there would be, in effect, a pro tanto reduction of absolute freedom to speak
on the air. A kind of nonselective principle of allocation might conceivably
have been adopted, perhaps in the form of an equal-time-for-all provision.
But, practically, equal-time allocation was unfeasible, because of the large
initial investment of capital required of a broadcaster; private enterprise
would have been unwilling to enter the field on an unpredictable limited-
time basis, and there would have been little opportunity for financial success
which could assure continuity of operation. Conceivably also some neutral
basis of selection-first-come-first-serve--might have been provided, but
such a program would have shared with equal-time the flaw of failing to
insure by screening applicants any degree of probability that the public
would have a station capable of staying on the air.
The solution actually adopted by Congress was a system pursuant to
which the FCC was empowered to grant construction permits, station
licenses and relicenses (licenses to be granted for terms of no longer than
three years) upon a finding that the public convenience, interest and neces-
sity would be served thereby.2 7 While no statutory mandate was provided
thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal
authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the
terms, conditions, and periods of the license." 48 Stat. 1081, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1958).
See also 48 Stat 1083, 47 U.S.C. § 304 (1958).
25 For a concise history of the Federal Communications Commission and its
predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission, see NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943); Hale & Hale, Competition Or Control II: Radio and Television Broad-
casting, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 585, 586-87 (1959).
26 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1958).
27 Communications Act of 1934 § 309(a), 48 Stat 1085, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(a) (1958). Note however, that § 307 of the act, containing the basic grant of
authority to the Commission, conditions the issuance of a license upon a finding of
public convenience, interest or necessity. 48 Stat. 1083, 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1958).
This is the language of the 1934 act as originally enacted. 48 Stat 1083. In the 1934
version, § 309 (a) also read public interest, convenience or necessity, 48 Stat. 1085, and
a companion provision in § 319 (a) required a finding of public convenience, interest
or necessity for issuance of a construction permit, 48 Stat. 1089. When in 1952
§ 308 was amended to refer to construction permits as well as licenses, 66 Stat. 714,
47 U.S.C. § 308 (1958), § 309(a) (which is recognizedly procedural in operation, 2
U.S. CONG. & AD. NEws 2243 (1952), and prescribes the form of Commission action
upon the applications required in § 308) was amended to read: public convenience,
interest and necessity. 66 Stat. 715, 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1958). No comment on
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directing to the Commission's consideration any specific content with which
to fill out the "public interest" phrase, it was enacted that all applications
should set forth such facts as the Commission should by regulation provide
as to, inter alia, the financial and technical qualifications and the character
of the applicant 2s-a clear authorization that the agency might consider,
at the least, these three criteria. The first two, certainly, are explicable in
terms of the necessity felt for securing efficient and stable radio-television
service, and would seem so reasonably conceived-as an exercise of legis-
lative discretion within the exigencies of the situation-as easily to pass
constitutional muster under first amendment challenge.29 The character
standard, however, is a consideration which does not directly affect success-
ful operation. If justifiable as a principle of selection, its relation to broad-
casting must be viewed in terms of insuring that the public will not be made
the change appears in the legislative history, and the formerly parallel provision of
§ 307(a) remained unchanged. The 1952 draftsmen, however, deleted the necessity
of finding public convenience, interest or necessity altogether from § 319(a), 66 Stat.
718, 47 U.S.C. § 319(a) (1958), on the theory that with the inclusion of permits in
the amended § 308, § 309 would impart the standard. 2 U.S. CoNG. & AD. NEws 2249
(1952). The result of the amendments is the double anomaly of a discrepancy be-
tween the condition upon which the Commission is empowered to grant a license
(§ 307) and the finding which they must make upon the application (the severer
standard of § 309) ; and of § 319(a), a substantive enabling clause, left unbounded by
any substantive prerequisite finding, although the procedure to be followed (Q 309)
requires such a finding. Ingenuity might spell out of the amendment an argument
that the amended § 309(a) was indeed intended to impose a more severe burden than
§ 307(a), that although a license could be issued on a finding of any of the three
components-convenience, interest or necessity-of § 307, the Commission would have
to find all three satisfied in order to grant a license without hearing under § 309 (a).
It is most unlikely that the 1952 draftsmen intended to work such a major procedural
change sub silentio, however, and the more likely explanation is a drafting slip. As
the interest-convenience-necessity phrase tends to be regarded as a single-word catch-
all in any event-the ubiquitous tag of regulatory legislation-these subtleties may
be conceded to have little potential for practical effect.
28 Communications Act of 1934 § 308(b), 48 Stat. 1084, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§308(b) (1958). Cf. Communications Act of 1934 §319(a), 48 Stat. 1089, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. §319(a) (1958). And see Wyszatycki v. United States, 267
F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1959). A fourth specified element of permissible inquiry as to
the quality of the applicant is his citizenship, a provision which must be read in
conjunction with § 310(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1086, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. §310(a) (1958), barring the grant of licenses to aliens. With
the inclusion of these provisions, and see text accompanying notes 57-60 infra, it
becomes apparent that Congress, in its regulation of communications, did not regard
itself as within the realm of strict applicability of first amendment guarantees.
291t has been recognized that the peculiar position of the broadcaster as at once
a conduit for expression and a controller of the access of others to a medium of
expression may sometimes require interference with the broadcaster's freedom in
the interest of the freedoms of those others. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,
342 U.S. 143 (1951), sustaining as against first amendment challenge an antitrust
injunction against a broadcaster who had attempted to utilize his radio monopoly
as an instrument of economic pressure. Cf. Communications Act of 1934 §§ 311, 313,
48 Stat. 1086, 1087, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 311, 313 (1958) (authorizing revocation
of license and forbidding subsequent relicensing of licensee found guilty of antitrust
violations). A fortiori it would seem that, faced with the natural necessity of selec-
tion, congressional direction that a licensing agency look to such technical and financial
qualifications as will tend to guarantee an uninterrupted continuity of broadcast service
by the licensee-the precondition of expression in the medium-should be constitu-
tionally unassailable.
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to suffer by the improper (in the minds of the regulators) utilization of a
persuasive means of communication by a licensee who may have no regard
for the public's welfare. Character is an indefinite term which may en-
compass many considerations and vary with the subjective approach of the
person or agency making the determination.
In one instance the Supreme Court has sustained the FCC's refusal to
renew a license for want of satisfaction of a character requirement: there
the applicant had concealed facts pertaining to stock ownership in the
station.30 "Character," then, at least insofar as it refers to action which
attempts affirmatively to impede or avoid the Commission's regulatory
functions under other criteria, is a proper element of evaluation in the
licensing process. It is probable that the Court would support its em-
ployment, also, as encompassing other positive actions by a licensee or
applicant as a broadcaster or which give rise to rational inferences that his
conduct as a broadcaster may work to the prejudice of the broadcasting
public. Open to question, however, is how far the term may be stretched
to refer to considerations evidenced by action which relates more peri-
pherally to the incidents of broadcasting before the Court will find the
Commission's utilization of it unreasonable.3 1
It is evident that the Communications Act regards the financial, tech-
nical and character considerations as illustrative, not exhaustive components
of the public interest. The Commission is authorized to have applicants set
forth such "other qualifications . . . to operate the station" and "such
other information as it may require." 82 More significantly, the legislative
scheme plainly envisages comparative-qualification hearings in the case of
competing applications,3 3 hearings which would be futile were consideration
restricted to the three enumerated considerations inasmuch as virtually all
applicants meet those first prerequisite standards. Read as a whole, the
grant of licensing authority to the Commission envisages its exercise in the
selection not merely of a competent but of the most competent applicant,
3 4
and in the course of that inquiry the FCC has wide discretion to look to
evidences of past conduct of the would-be-broadcaster. In fact, in the con-
text of comparative hearings, the agency has attempted to fill out the mean-
ing of the public interest phrase by criteria of its own formulation which
have made the term a many-sided concept.85
80 FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946).
81 In using "character" as a justification for the exclusion of an applicant from
access to broadcasting, it is questionable whether it would be proper to consider the
applicant's character in terms of those factors which have no relation to broadcasting,
such as, for example, his marital infidelity or reputation for mendacity.
32 Communications Act of 1934 § 308(b), 48 Stat. 1084, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 308(b) (1958).
33 Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945). Compare Communications
Act of 1934 § 310(b), 48 Stat. 1086, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1958).
34 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17 (1943).
85 See generally Irion, FCC Criteria For Competing Applicants, 43 MINr. L.
REv. 479 (1959); Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 947 (1951).
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The FCC and "Public Interest"
In the selective process, the FCC has considered, inter alia, preservation
of competition within the mass media as a totality,386 integration of station
ownership and management,37 diversity of experience 88 and participation
of the station owners in local affairs of the community to be served 9__
criteria which indicate the Commission's preference for close identity of
the broadcaster to the community within his transmission range, and its
tendency to regard him as a local service institution.40  Moreover, it has
exercised a degree of control -over broadcast programming both through
comparative hearings and statements of policy. Past program records and
programming proposals have been a significant consideration in FCC
licensing decisions. 41 In its consideration of the programming dimension,
it has favored a "balanced" schedule,42 which, as conceived by the Com-
mission, should include sufficient time devoted to local live programs 43 and
sustaining time for public service programs. 44 On the negative side, the
FCC has expressed its distaste for, inter alia, advertising excess,$4 5 broad-
casting of horseracing results,46 licensee editorializing 47 and fortune telling
386See Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950), where the
court upheld denial of a license based on the applicant's history of monopolistic prac-
tices in the newspaper business directed at the suppression of a local radio station.
Ownership of other media of communication alone, however, is not always of control-
ling significance. See McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957).37 See St. Louis Telecast, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 625, 722 (1957), where the FCC stated
that participation of stockholders in active management "tends to assure continuing
effective action of the licensee in carrying out his proposals." Nevertheless, the
award of construction was made to CBS, as it assured the Commission that it would
select a station manager from the community to be served. The result seems to
indicate that the FCC has blended the concepts of integration of ownership and man-
agement with management's identity to the community to be served. See also Hi-Line
Broadcasting Co., 22 F.C.C. 891, 912 (1957).
38 See Irion, supra note 35, at 485.
39 FCC, Network Study Staff, Network Broadcasting, H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1958): "It has been assumed that applicants firmly rooted in
community background and interest and prominently identified with local business
and civic life are in an excellent position to render a sensitive response to community
demands."
40 Cf. FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Co., 349 U.S. 358, on remand, 232 F.2d
57 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1015 (1956). See also H.R. REP. No.
1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1958) ; Fowler, The Policy of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission With Respect to Programing, 2 J. BROADCASTING 99, 101 (1958).
41 See Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Bay
State Beacon, Inc. v. FCC, 171 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1948).4 2 Cherokee Broadcasting Co., 25 F.C.C. 92, 114 (1958).
43 Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 1007 (1956) ; Cherokee Broadcasting Co., supra note 42, at 114.
44 FCC, PUBLIc SavicE RESPONSImLITY OF BROADCAST LIcENsEEs 5, 12 (1946).
45 KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931); KMPC,
Station of the Stars, Inc., 7 F.C.C. 449 (1939); May Seed & Nursery Co., 2 F.C.C.
559 (1936).
46 Cf. Capital Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 648 (1948).
47 Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940). Seemingly criticizing
any editorializing by licensees in its dictum in the Mayflower opinion, the Commission
later modified its position to condone licensee editoralizing so long as the licensees
allow others access to the airways to present conflicting points of view. See United
Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945); Note, 59 YALE L.J. 759 (1950).
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shows.48 In 1946, the agency issued a comprehensive statement on pro-
gramming which was designed to serve as a guide to radio licensees in the
formation of program schedules. Known generally as the Blue Book, this
statement was in many respects a compilation of the position taken by the
Commission in its prior licensing decisions.49
The effect of this scheme of action has been to induce licensees and
prospective licensees to conform to an agency-conceived programming
pattern in order to present a favorable record to the Commission on appli-
cation for license renewal or grant.50 Indeed, the FCC's practice in this
regard has been criticized as coercion and censorship,51 but in Federal
Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co.,52 the one license
denial case based on programming considerations which reached the
Supreme Court, the Court sustained the Commission's ruling terminating
a temporary license and awarding the license to a competing applicant.
The broadcast area in Nelson had a large foreign language population, and
the determining factor was the successful applicant's proposal to broadcast
a number of foreign language programs, in contrast to the temporary
licensee's schedule of straight network broadcasts. The decision represents
the Court's affirmance of agency power to look to the subject matter of a
broadcaster's presentations-at least in terms of broad overall patterns-
in granting or withholding access to the airways. More fundamentally, it
represents judicial approval of the FRC's conception of the role of the
individual licensee as a servant of his local audience, under a nondelegable
duty to provide for his community a program of expression concordant with
community needs.53 The same philosophy underlies the Court's approach in
NBC v. United States,54 sustaining against network attack the Commis-
sion's "Chain Broadcasting Regulations." 55 There Mr. Justice Frank-
furter for the Court flatly acknowledged the function of the FCC, in the
fulfillment of its duty of selective allocation of the nation's limited available
airspace, to examine the content of a licensee's presentations, 56 and held
within the competence of the agency the policy determination that the public
interest would be better served by local autonomy than by centralized
network dominance.
4 8 Radio Broadcasting Corp., 4 F.C.C. 125 (1937).
49 FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES (1946).
5 0
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 77 (1959); SMEAD, FREEDom OF SPEECH By
RADIO AND TELEVISION 34 (1959).
51 SmEAD, op. cit. supra note 50, at 108-09; 1 WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION
LAW §38 (1948).
52 289 U.S. 266 (1933).
53 See Regents v. Carroll, 338 U.S. 586 (1950); Massachusetts Universalist
Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950); McIntire v.
Wm. Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1945); Albuquerque Broad-
casting Co. v. Regents, 70 F. Supp. 198 (D.C.N.M. 1945), aff'd, 158 F.2d 900 (1947).
54 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
55 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.131-.138 (1958).
56319 U.S. at 215-16: "[T]he Act does not restrict the Commission merely to
supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the Commission the burden of determining
the composition of that traffic."
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Thus there can be no doubt that within the regulatory framework
chartered by Congress, administered by the Commission and sustained by
the Court, a broadcaster's right of expression over the air is a freedom
strictly limited by concomitant obligations. Free speech via a communica-
tions license must mean something other than the freedom of the individual
to speak his mind in the streets. This philosophy is patent on the face of
the act, both throughout its immediate substantive provisions-denial of
licenses to aliens,57 revocation for antitrust violations,5" requirement of
equal time for political candidates 5 9 and of announcement of paid ad-
vertising as such '°-and in its broad delegation to the FCC of powers
of control not only by licensing 6 ' but by rule-maling,62 cease-and-
desist order,63 and (in enumerated circumstances) suspension 64 and revoca-
57 Communications Act of 1934 § 310(a), 48 Stat. 1086, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§310(a) (1958).
58 Communications Act of 1934 §§ 311, 313, 48 Stat. 1086, 1087, as amended, 47
U.S.C. §§ 311, 313 (1958).
59 Communications Act of 1934 § 315, 48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315
(1958).
60 Communications Act of 1934 § 317, 48 Stat. 1089, 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1958).
61The FCC has been characterized as primarily a licensing, rather than a
regulatory agency. Kennedy, Programing Content and Quality, 22 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 541, 545 (1957). Because licenses may run for no more than three years,
Communications Act of 1934 § 307(d), 48 Stat. 1083, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d)
(1958), and renewals require a Commission finding of public interest, convenience
and necessity, Communications Act of 1934 § 307(d), 66 Stat. 714, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d)
(1958), the license power is a continuing power to police. Although the FCC has
power to revoke, inter alia, upon any grounds upon which it could refuse to grant a
license, Communications Act of 1934 § 312(a) (2), 48 Stat. 1086, as amended, 47
U.S.C. § 312(a) (2) (1958), it is the practice of the agency to bide its time and apply
whatever pressure it wishes to bring to bear via the relicensing process. See Kassner,
Radio Censorship, 8 Aia L. Rxv. 99 (9317). Tactically, this appears the better part
of valor, as in revocation proceedings the Commission would bear the burden of
proof. Communications Act of 1934 § 312(d), 48 Stat. 1086, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(d) (1958). In any event, the FCC's policy, when an objectionable practice on
the part of a licensee is brought to its attention, is to announce that it will take the
incident into account when the licensee applies for its next renewal. See, e.g., 9
Am L. RvV. 202, 203 (1938). In fact, the Commision has used its power to refuse
relicense very sparingly, see Fowler, spra note 40, at 99; JAFFE, ADmiNISTRATIVE
LAw 220 (1954), yet this subtle in terrorem technique has been regarded by the
commentators as a devastatingly effective instrument of control. DAvis, op. cit. s1upra
note 50, at 75; SiEAD, op. cit. supra note 50, at 100.
62 Communications Act of 1934 § 303(r), 48 Stat. 1082, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 303(r) (1958). Commission rules are enforceable by cease-and-desist order, Com-
munications Act of 1934 § 312(b), 48 Stat. 1086 (1952), 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1958),
or by suspension of license, Communications Act of 1934 § 303(m) (1) (A), 48 Stat.
1082, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303(m) (1) (A) (1958). Wilful violation of a rule is
per se criminal, Communications Act of 1934 § 502, 48 Stat. 1100, 47 U.S.C. § 502
(1958), and wilful and repeated violation is grounds for revocation of a license,
Communications Act of 1934 § 312(a) (4), 48 Stat. 1086, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(a) (4) (1958).
63 Communications Act of 1934 § 312(b), 48 Stat. 1086 (1952), 47 U.S.C. § 312(b)
(1958).
64 Communications Act of 1934 § 303(m), 48 Stat. 1082, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§303(m) (1958). Of special interest here is the Commission's power under that
subsection to suspend an operating license upon proof sufficient to satisfy it that the
licensee (inter alia): "(D) has transmitted superfluous radio communications or
signals or communications containing profane or obscene words, language, or mean-
ing, or has knowingly transmitted-(1) false or deceptive signals or communications,
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tion.65 Read as a whole, the statute vests broad powers and duties of polic-
ing in the FCC, and demands that, at least in its enforcement of specific
prescriptions of the act (and, if so, why not also in pursuit of its licensing
function for protection of the public interest?) the agency closely examine
the specific content of particular communications.
Section 326
Yet in the foreground of this wide perspective of control is erected one
categorical barrier to the Commission's powers. This is section 326:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or
signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio communication." 66 Fear
of censorship was a matter of intense congressional concern at the time of
enactment of the initial federal regulatory measure, 7 the Radio Act of
1927," and from the time of inclusion in that act of the anticensorship
mandate, 9 the Federal Radio Commission,"0 and the Federal Communica-
tions Commission after it,7 1 have avoided like the plague any claim of a
censor's power. True, others have regarded the function of the Commission
or (2) a call signal or letter which has not been assigned by proper authority to the
station he is operating ...." Subparagraph (1), added in 1937, 50 Stat. 190, 47 U.S.C.
§ 303(m) (D) (1) (1958, could conceivably offer on its face a source of authority for
FCC control of deceptive programming. Its context and its vintage, however, suggest
that it refers rather to misleading attributions of source or to false messages calculated
to induce action by the receiver than to the peculiarly subtle problem of concealment
in entertainment. The 1937 amendments to the Communications Act were designed for
the promotion of maritime safety through radio, and all the legislative history is con-
cerned exclusively with that subject. Subparagraph (1), then (although nowhere
specifically discussed in the course of the history), would seem to relate particularly
to the transmission of "false or deceptive signals" by marine radio operators. See 81
CoNG. REc. 2463 (1937) ; Hearings on S. 595 Before Senate Committee on Commerce,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). See also Hearings on S. 3954 Before Senate Committee
on Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1936). (Note, however, that false call letters
are specifically treated by subparagraph (D) (2) and that false danger signals are
also expressly handled elsewhere in the act. Communications Act of 1934 § 325 (a),
48 Stat. 1091, 47 U.S.C. § 325 (a) (1958).) In any event, the quoted passage does give
an indication of the congressional purpose that the FCC closely scrutinize the contents
of at least some kinds of communications.
65 Communications Act of 1934 § 312(a), 48 Stat. 1086, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§312(a) (1958). See notes 61, 62 supra.
06 Communications Act of 1934 § 326, 48 Stat 1091, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 326
(1952).
67 See, e.g., 67 CoNG. REc. 5473 (1926). See Note, 46 HAMw. L. REV. 987 (1933).
68 Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
69 Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, §29, 44 Stat. 1172.
70 See 2 FRC ANN. REP. 160 (1928).
71 See H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); 23 FCC ANNX. REP.
12-13 (1957). Cf. Hi-Line Broadcasting Co., 22 F.C.C. 891, 914-15 (1957). See also
Bellows, Is Radio Censored?, 171 HARPE'as 697, 701 (1935); U.S. News & World
Rep., Oct. 26, 1959, p. 46.
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as censorial, 72 but it is a matter of significance that the federal regulatory
scheme, when it came before the Supreme Court in the NBC case came
embodying the congressional declaration of section 326 and glossed with
a long administrative tradition that "censorship" was taboo.7 3 It would be
unreal to suppose that any application of the existing regulatory legislation,
or any alteration of it, which crossed over into the area of "censorship"
(whatever meaning that vague term be given), would draw any support
from NBC. What NBC did say, simply, was:
"The licensing system established by Congress in the Communications
Act of 1934 was a proper exercise of its power over commerce. The
standard it provided for the licensing of stations was the 'public in-
terest, convenience, or necessity.' Denial of a station license on that
ground, if valid under the Act, is not a denial of free speech." 74
Indeed, a wider perspective of the context of that decision is suggestive.
What was at issue there was the power of the FCC to curb network
dominion of the air. The decision was a decision in the direction of decen-
tralization. It must be kept in mind that the naturally limited quality of
the communications media makes any centralization-whether in terms of
broadcaster or of government accumulation of control-a growth of power
to dictate the policy decision as to what may be spoken and heard on the
air. In radio and television there are in fact two tiers of regulation: public
and private, agency and licensee. The first works always upon the second.
For this reason, an exercise of power by the FCC, even one which is
premised upon a reaction to broadcast content, need not be "censorial"-
need not, in other words, constitute a decision as to what shall be expressed,
or be kept silent, over the ether. In the NBC case the Commission's
action was not censorial, in this sense, and at another level it disrupted a
precondition of effective private censorship. In other cases, its intervention
will be more ambiguous: when it looks to program patterning and attempts
to induce or compel an individual broadcaster to diversify his presentation,
a choice as to what shall not be heard may conceal an allocating to a larger
number of voices the choice as to what shall be heard.
72 See Caldwell, Legal Restrictions on the Contents of Broadcast Programs,
9 AIR L. Rxv. 229 (1938) ; Note, 39 COLUm. L. R-v. 447 (1939).
73 Consider the analogy drawn by Mr. Justice Black for the Court in Farmers
Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529-30 (1959) (holding that under the equal-
time-for-political-candidates provision of the Communications Act § 315(a), 48 Stat.
1088, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (a) (1958), a broadcaster cannot delete defamatory
statements from a candidate's speech) : "Recognizing radio's potential importance as
a medium of communication of political ideas, Congress sought to foster its broadest
possible utilization by encouraging broadcasting stations to make their facilities avail-
able to candidates for office without discrimination, and by insuring that these candi-
dates when broadcasting were not to be hampered by censorship of the issues they
could discuss. Thus, expressly applying this country's tradition of free expression
to the field of radio broadcasting, Congress has from the first emphatically forbidden
the Commission to exercise any power of censorship over radio communication. [citing
§ 326.] It is in line with this same tradition that the individual licensee has con-
sistently been denied 'power of censorship' in the vital area of political broadcasts."
74 319 U.S. at 227. (Emphasis added.)
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The area of analysis is one of vague phrases. "Censorship" has no
clearer referrent than "free speech" or "public interest." Whether one or
another of the tags should apply in a given situation where the FCC seeks
to control by its own evaluative judgment the utterance or nonutterance of
a specific expression depends upon which of two dangers is, in that situation,
stronger: the danger in having the decision made by forces which do not,
as does a government agency, disinterestedly adopt as a first premise the
search for a public "good"-or the danger in having a government agency
tell the public what the public "good" is. To date there have been virtually
no judicial decisions which have had to strike that balance on circumstances
which have clear implications for the specific problem of program deception.
The Commission's own resolution-made within the framework of the
existing legislation and upon the predicate that what is at stake (in terms
of sanction) is the grant or refusal of a broadcasting license-is that it
should not take action against program deception.75 That conclusion is
articulated as an instance of the general principle that where Congress has
not seen fit to make unlawful by specific provision some incident of a given
broadcast, the FCC will look to that particular broadcast only for its
significance within an overall pattern of program balance, not with a view
to assessing its merits or demerits as an isolated communication.7 6
Two cases which may constitute exceptions to this principle and which
have reached the courts may be relevant. In KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n
v. FRC,77 a license had been granted to a corporation wholly controlled by
one Dr. Brinkley, a medical doctor and producer of secret-formula patent
medicines which he sold through an association of druggists. During three
half-hour periods daily Dr. Brinkley appeared personally on the air to
conduct his "medical question box," a program in the course of which he
diagnosed and prescribed treatment for cases solely from symptoms de-
scribed in letters sent in by his audience. In a very substantial percentage
of cases, Dr. Brinkley patent medicines were prescribed and, in any event,
the FRC found that sight-unseen diagnosis was inimical to the public health
and safety, and on that ground refused to renew the Doctor's license. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia sustained the Commission
against the contention that its action constituted a forbidden censorship
within the meaning of the Act. In Trinity Methodist Church, South v.
FRC,78 the licensee had as its minister the Reverend Shuler, who in fact
75 See note 5 mtpra.
76 The Commission, intent on avoiding the charge of censorship, has generally
phrased the concept conversely: that the censorship prohibition does not bar it from
review of the overall program record of a licensee. See FCC, op. cit. supra note
49, at 9. Implied in the opinion of Dumont Labs. v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951), is the recognition that at least this much
control over programing is envisaged by the Communications Act. See Note, 19
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 312 (1951). Query how meaningful the distinction between
particular program content and overall program balance is as an abstract proposition.
Is "editorializing," see note 47 ='pra, a matter of "content' or balance?
77 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
7862 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 685 (1932).
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operated the station. Over it he defamed the board of health, called the
local labor temple a bootleegging joint, insulted the Jews as a race, attacked
the Catholic Church, accused the bar association of action for ulterior
motives, and commented so persistently and so violently upon the conduct
of judges and judicial officers in cases presently pending that a California
court found him in contempt. 79 Moreover, on one occasion he announced
on the air that he had possession of and would make public certain com-
promising information about an as-yet unnamed local gentleman unless that
gentleman contributed one hundred dollars to the church-and the
Reverend Doctor received a number of contributions. The FRC declined to
relicense the station and again the Circuit Court sustained the Commission,
rejecting Shuler's claims to first amendment protection. Both KFKB and
Trinity are a step beyond the Nelson Brothers (program balance) type of
case, certainly, in the direction of the deceptive programming situation. A
long step remains, however, before the situations are on a par. In KFKB
the injury found was a danger to the physical health of a numerous class
of individuals, and (if that finding is accepted) there remains little room for
serious moral controversy to whose resolution the FRC might commit the
compulsive force of government. Trinity is more difficult, involving as it
does the expression of political and ethical judgments, and thus a situation
in which the agency is forced-at least ostensibly-into the role of judge
between prevailing and dissentient ideologies. But this objection is largely
overborne on the facts of Trinity by Shuler's contempt conviction, which
furnishes an independent judgment by a policy-making arm of the govern-
ment that the communications involved constituted a public injury in other
than the merely moral realm. This circumstance brings the case within
the sway of the FCC's currently articulated principle that it may take action
against single broadcasts some one of whose incidents is otherwise unlaw-
ful,80 and it distinguishes the deceptive programming situation which former
Commissioner Doerfer, with precisely this sense, characterized as not a legal
deception.8 1 The quality of economic harm involved in Shuler's blackmail-
like extortion, too, has no counterpart in program deception.
8 2
AMENDMENT: THE MATTER OF SANCTIONS
Absent, then, some more explicit legislative directive than the conflict-
ing generalities of "public interest" and section 326, there is some support
for Mr. Doerfer's conclusion that the FCC has no authority to cope with
deceptive programming as such. The case is debatable. But since, in any
79 See Ex parte Shuler, 210 Cal. 377, 292 Pac. 481 (1930).
80 This factor is of significance in the constitutional (as well as in the statutory)
dimension insofar as the independent source of illegality would itself be constitutionally
testable and would stand or fall as such. It is assumed that the "otherwise unlawful"
act is operated through the communications medium so that revocation would be an
administrative remedy rationally related to the prevention of that act.
81 See note 5 supra.
82 This is not to argue that Trinity is good constitutional law: merely that even
if it were, it does not cover the quiz shows.
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event, the Commission is indisposed to take action under the present act,
and since legislation seems likely, a more significant question is what form
such legislation should take.
It has been suggested earlier in this Note that the decision to legislate
at all in the premises may be unwise. Once that decision has been made in
favor of legislating, another preliminary objection may appear. Insofar
as Mr. Doerfer is right in finding a lack of present power in the FCC,
does riot that finding also doom any and all legislation? The current
inhibition, if it exists at all, is a creature of section 326 which, it might be
said, does no more than give express recognition to the first amendment.
Can a change in the form of the statute, affecting none of the underlying
fact considerations, shift the constitutional balance?
Two points should be made. First, it is precisely in this range of
situations where the constitutional answer is most uncertain that express
legislative declaration is apt to have decisive effect. The decision of the
legislature that a specific problem is of sufficient gravity to merit treatment
may itself tip the scales in favor of validity. Second, there remains within
the field of legislative action a choice of means. Among various means,-
various sanctions-what is at stake for the individual varies. On this, both
the constitutionality and the wisdom of a measure may depend.
The discussion of communications regulation thus far has been in the
context of the sanction almost exclusively employed by the FCC under past
and present practice: the licensing power. Control of a given activity by
regarding that activity as grounds for agency denial of a license or relicense
(or revocation of a license) is, at first glance, the sanction most easily
rationalized against constitutional attack, in light of the theory that the
initial justification for regulation of expression over the airwaves is the
necessity of selection imposed by the physical limitation of frequencies. It
is against this rationalization that Nelson Brbthers, NBC, KFKB and
Trinity were decided.
Continued utilization of this sanction as the primary instrument in an
amended scheme of regulation designed to give the FCC an expressly
delegated measure of power to deal with program deception is, of course, a
possibility. Congress might simply declare deception, properly defined,
against the public interest, and empower the Commission to make it a
grounds of license refusal or revocation. There would, of course, be a
serious problem of sufficiently precise definition.83 But once over that
83 The sphere of conflict between state exercise of the police power and first
amendment freedoms has become the area of crucial significance for the application
of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
See also Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195
(1955); Comment, 53 MicH. L. REv. 264 (1954). In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952), the term "sacrilegious" was held too uncertain a guide for admin-
istrative licensing action. See also Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education,
346 U.S. 587 (1954) (per curiam). However, "obscene" expression has been treated as
an isolable genus of creature, see Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), of distinct
character and having a particular constitutional status. See Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1951). And in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), "loud and
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hurdle, the system would seem the least radical departure from present
procedures.
Yet use of the licensing power as a force of control--especially by the
practice of threatened, rather than actual refusal to relicense-(the so-called
regulation by the "lifted eyebrow") 84 has been severely criticized.8 5 Agency
policy statements regarding programming,88 in the form of dicta, speeches,
press releases, publications, letters, have been consistently followed by
broadcasters who prefer to conform to pressure than to risk disfavor with
the FCC. In such a situation, there is little opportunity to test the validity
of the FCC's policy; in order to procure judicial review the licensee must
flaunt the announced policy and precipitate Commission action against him
-at the risk of the extremely substantial investment he has placed in his
facilities. Unwarranted agency control may be allowed to continue in-
definitely without challenge-a condition which would be especially danger-
ous at the ill-defined periphery where "deception" runs into constitutionally
protected free expression,8 7 or where activities whose moral impact on
society may justify restriction shade off into more ambiguous practices
regarded by many as simply good showmanship. 8 Other criticisms made
raucous" escaped condemnation by the Court. Notice that as between Burstyn and
Kovacs there is a difference in what is at stake: in the former is presented the
question of state power entirely to suppress a particular expression; in the latter, the
question of the power of the state to regulate the means by which or the manner in
which a given communication may be made. Clearly this is a distinction of some
significance for consideration of the problem of first amendment guarantees in the
communications field (note the court's insistence in Trinity, 62 F.2d at 853, that
refusal to relicense Shuler deprived him only of one medium of expression and that
there was nothing to stop his continued fulmination via other modes), and it will have
its impact upon the way the judiciary will regard the various sub-issues presented
in that regulation: vagueness, propriety of delegation, degree of danger requisite to
justify control. In light of the Court's recent preoccupation with issues of definition
in this area, however, it can at least be said that the extreme difficulty of working
out a clear definition of the activity regarded as objectionable under the "program
deception!' rubric poses a substantial initial obstacle to regulation of that activity.
84 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 50, at 75.
85 See notes 50-51 supra.
86A recent instance of this practice is former Chairman Doerfer's sugges-
tion to the three television networks that they institute a rotating schedule of
public service programs during prime evening hours. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1960, p. 1,
col. 7. Sharp criticism of this proposal has been made on the grounds that it is
contrary to the theory that the ultimate burden to serve the public interest is on the
broadcaster and that the networks are currently providing programs in excess of
the number suggested by Mr. Doerfer. See Gould, TV: The Doerfer Plan, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 20, 1960, p. 63, col. 2; Time, Feb. 1, 1960, p. 52.
87 The Court has been particularly chary of regulation which in effect straddles
the line between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible,
leaving to the subject of the regulation the alternatives of declining to assert his
constitutional liberties to the full extent to which he believes they extend, or of
running the risk of miscalculation. See, in addition to the cases cited in note 83
supra which wrestle with the problem of vagueness, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940). Compare the Court's labored efforts in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91 (1945).8 8 Notice that where the problem of unconstitutional vagueness arises in con-
nection with administratively enforced regulatory legislation, it has two distinct
aspects: "vagueness" for purposes of delegation, see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and "vagueness" for purposes of adequate
notice, see Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952). Notice
how the two issues flow together in such a situation as that presented in Watdns v.
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of the FCC's administration of the current regulatory scheme have been
that the Commission has failed to articulate its concept of the "public
interest" 89 and has failed, in addition, to achieve any degree of consistency
in the application of its established criteria.90 Certainly if program decep-
tion is to be utilized as a criterion in the process of licensee selection, the
dangers of vague and inconsistent application should be avoided, especially
in light of the questionable harm involved in the practice.
Alternatively, Congress might order (rather than enable) the FCC to
refuse a license or relicense on finding that the applicant has been previously
guilty of deceptive programming, a provision which-because the issue of
program deception as a bar to license grant would typically be raised in a
comparative 91 or protest 9 2 hearing and would be reviewable in the courts
at the instance of the party raising it 93 -would in large measure avoid the
dangers inherent in FCC discretion. However, even under such a device
the Commission would retain considerable freedom through its power to
find the facts subject to very limited judicial oversight,94 and there is reason
to believe that the very severity of license-renewal refusal as a sanction for
deceptive programming would exert a degree of influence which would
incline the agency (and probably, indeed, a court on review) to be very
slow to discover that evidence of deception was convincing. A rule of law
which establishes a sanction which its enforcers are likely to regard as
incommensurate with the evil at which it is aimed is unlikely to be particu-
larly effective.
This realization of the severity of the sanction points up that as a
matter of practical fact, as opposed to theory, any provision which directs
or authorizes the taking away of a licensee's broadcasting privilege as a
consequence of his having transmitted a particular program is subject to
more fundamental attack than the risk of nullification. If it is in fact
applied, how different is this sanction (although translated into a different
sphere where it can be conceptually justified under the necessity-of-
selectivity rationale) from the prior restraint condemned in Near v.
Minnesota? 9 5 A continuing course of Supreme Court decisions has made
United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). Notice also the tendency to confuse them in
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), and Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957), where the delegation issue, in these state cases, cannot, as such,
be before the Court.
89 H.R. REP. No. 2711, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1959).
90 See Schwartz, Comparative Television and the Chancellor's Foot, 47 GEo.
L.J. 655 (1959) ; Bendiner, The FCC-Who Will Regulate the Regulators?, Reporter,
Sept. 19, 1957), p. 26; Jaffe, The Scandal in TV Licemning, Harper's, Sept. 1957, p. 77.
91 See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945). Such an issue might
also be raised by an intervenor under § 309(b) of the Communications Act, 48 Stat.
1085 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1958).
92 Pursuant to Communications Act of 1934 § 309(c), 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 309(c) (1958). See 107 U. PA. L. REv. 551 (1959).
93 Communications Act of 1934 § 402(b), 48 Stat. 1093, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 402(b) (1958).
94 Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e)
(1958). See Massachusetts Bay Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir.
1958); Easton Publishing Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
95 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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clear that it is not only the "prior"-ness of restriction " which will result
in its constitutional infirmity.97 But there can be no doubt as to the con-
temporary vigor 9 8 of the basic holding of Near: that the past perpetration
of an act, through the vehicle of speech or expression of ideas, which act
itself may be so harmful to the public as to subject its perpetrator to punish-
ment for it, will nevertheless not justify the imposition upon him of a
blanket ban on all future expression. To test this principle in the com-
munications field: 9 9 can there be any doubt that a statute which prescribed
that, upon a finding that the producers of a given program had practiced
program deception, an injunction should issue forever restraining the pres-
entation of that program, would be more susceptible of constitutional attack
than a provision that, upon the same finding, the producers might be forever
enjoined from subsequent repetition of their deceptive programming prac-
tices? 100 Yet refusal to renew a license not only muffles the future-
innocent along with the future-guilty within the confines of a single program,
but wholly cuts the former licensee off the air.
These considerations suggest the search for a system of control which
would be more easily and flexibly invoked, more reviewable, less subject
to agency caprice and less liable to assault on grounds like those which
underlay Near than is regulation by the pressure of relicense refusal. It
has been noted above that the FCC has rule-making power and power to
enforce by cease-and-desist order violations of the statute or of its rules. 10 1
96 The "prior restraint" theme has nevertheless been a recurrent one in the
Court's first amendment opinions. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938). But see Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), some of
whose implications are discussed in text accompanying notes 115-18 infra.97 E.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.
367 (1947) ; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).9 8 Consider the Court's cautious distinction and preservation of the principles of
Near in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 445 (1957), and the strong
reaffirmation of Near in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1952).
99 It is true that the constitutional point of balance of permissible government
control upon freedom of expression will incline to tolerate a greater measure of
control where the expression claiming protection is of a commercial character.
Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), with Kim Young v. Cali-
fornia and Snyder v. Milwaukee, decided together under the single opinion in Schnei-
der v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). But Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, supra note 98,
makes clear the Supreme Court's inclination to accord substantial free-speech pro-
tection to commercial entertainment via the mass media.
100 Analogy might be drawn to the Supreme Court's treatment of state court
injunctions of picketing in the wake of Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
Where picketing has involved violence, the Court has permitted injunction of the acts
of violence themselves, Hotel Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315
U.S. 437 (1942); ef. UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266
(1956) (pre-emption), but has consistently reversed broad injunctions prohibiting
all future picketing. E.g., Local 795, Chauffeurs Union v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341
(1958) (per curiam) ; Local 302, Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S.
293 (1943) ; AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941). And see Youngdahl v. Rainfair,
Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957), a pre-emption case in which the Court sustained that
part of the injunction which prohibited violence but reversed as much as prohibited
peaceful picketing, distinguishing Local 753, Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadow-
moor Dairies, Inc, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
101 See notes 61-65 supra. Note that violations of the act or regulations are also
grounds, unde specified circumstances, for suspension or revocation, and, if wilful,
are criminal per se.
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These powers have never been used in the area of programming, although
their use has recently been suggested by the Attorney General.10 2 Control
by regulations would seem to offer a number of advantages: initial sub-
jection to judicial review, 03 eliminating the menace of the "lifted eye-
brow"; probability that definitive articulation of principles would dispel the
tendency to inconsistency which critics have seen in the Commission's ap-
plication of the nebulous "public interest" standard; availability of sanc-
tions tailored to the measure of the offense and not requiring the Hobson's
choice between donothingness and complete annihilation of a broadcaster's
access to the air.
A number of combinations of these mechanisms are possible. Congress
might proscribe certain specifically defined acts by statute, leaving enforce-
ment to FCC restraining order. Or it might in more general terms 104
authorize the Commission to define by rule deceptive programming, and
then to enforce its own rules by order; or Congress might declare violation
of agency-made rules criminal per se.10 5 If enforcement is to be by cease-
and-desist order, again a number of patterns are available. FCC orders
might be made final propio vigore after the lapse of an appeal period, their
subsequent violation punishable criminally or by contempt.10 6 Or the
agency might be required to petition a court for an enforcing order, whose
entry would be requisite to give such compulsive effect to the administrative
decree.'0 7  A third possible alternative 108 would be the two-free-bites
procedure now provided under the Communications Act: 10 9 if, after entry
of an agency order, that order is disobeyed, the Commission may then
petition for an enforcement decree whose violation, in turn, constitutes a
contempt."10 A wholly different kind of control legislation is that which
the FCC itself proposed following its recent hearings on deceptive program-
ming."' It has suggested that Congress make program deception criminal
and that, in addition, Congress empower the Commission to impose fines
and temporarily suspend broadcast licenses."12  Pursuant to its thesis that
in the dimension of communications content it currently has power to
look-other than as regards over-all programming-only to broadcasts
102 ATilv GEN., REP ON DECEPTIVE PAcTIcEs IN BROADCASTING MEDIA (1959),
in N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1960, ,p. 10, col. 3.
10348 Stat. 1093 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §402(a) (1958). See NBC v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 193 (1943).
104 But see notes 83, 88 supra.
105 Wilful violations of FCC regulations are criminal under the present act. See
note 62 "tpra.
106 This is the procedure currently embodied in § 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, added by 52 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
107 This is the procedure currently employed under § 10(e) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 61 Stat. 147 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1958).
108 These alternatives are discussed in JAFFE, op. cit. supra note 61, at 482.
109 Communications Act of 1934 § 401(b), 48 Stat. 1092, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 401(b) (1958).
110 Compare § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
"'1 See 24 FED. REG. 9275, 9377 (1959).
1.2 Wall Street 1., Feb. 5, 1960, p. 2, col. 3.
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which violate specific law,113 the agency no doubt feels that penal legislation
would extend the measure of its own controls.
These various possible schemes are subject to varying constitutional
and practical objections. Regulation by cease-and-desist order, although it
does seem to offer significant advantages as compared to regulation by the
menace of nonrenewal of licenses, presents substantial difficulties of its own.
In the first place, assuming for a moment that Congress could constitution-
ally punish, post hoc, the act of knowingly broadcasting deceptive pro-
gramming,"1 4 there remains the question to what extent, under the rule of
Near, it can visit such broadcasting with the sanction of a prior proscription
of future conduct. In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,11 5 a 5-4 decision,
the Court departed from Near to the extent of permitting the issuance of a
temporary injunctive order-after a rule to show cause before a judicial
officer-which restrained the exhibition of allegedly obscene publications
pending the course of a specifically expedited adjudication of obscenity.
Will Kingsley support an FCC restraining order? Even the majority
opinion in that case stresses heavily the procedural safeguards of a pre-
liminary judicial hearing prior to temporary-and of full-scale judicial trial
prior to permanent-enjoining order. Can an administrative proceeding
be substituted for that judicial hearing and still remain within the constitu-
tional pale? 1 1 6 It seems clear that, under a procedure of self-operative ad-
ministrative orders, a broadcaster could find himself subject to a contempt
decree without ever having been heard in court.11 7 Even under the scheme
of agency petition for a judicial enforcing order, the limited scope of judicial
review of fact in the enforcement proceeding poses a case significantly
different from Kingsley. The two-bites system, perhaps, is unobjectionable,
as under it the broadcaster will get a judicial trial both of the validity of
113 Ibid. Perhaps the FCC relies on FCC v. ABC, 347 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1954),
where the Court considered that the Commission could take action against the broad-
casting of lotteries prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1958).
114 The issue of congressional power to punish the broadcasting of a rigged pro-
gram should be distinguished from the issue of congressional power to punish the
rigging itself. It is of course the former which concerns us here.
115 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
116 Long prior to its recent decisions in Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958),
Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (per curiam),
Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) (per curiam), and Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), the Supreme Court had recognized by a consistent line
of cases the constitutional impediment to committing to administrative or executive
discretion-as opposed to narrowly circumscribed judicial authority-the power to
determine the permissibility of expression at the fringes of the first amendment's
sphere of protection. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Mary-
land, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). Compare Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 396 (1953),
and Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), with Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S.
418 (1943), and Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 603 (1942) (dissenting opinion
adopted as opinion of the Court in per curiam reversal on rehearing, 319 U.S. 103
(1943)), and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939), and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Compare also the
Schneider case, in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 141, 164-65 (1939), with Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).1 17 See United States v. Piuma, 40 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Cal. 1941), aff'd, 126 F.2d
601 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 637 (1942).
19601
890 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the order and-on the facts-of his violation of it, but the mechanism is
extremely cumbersome. s18 It may be argued, of course, that an analysis
based on Kingsley is in no way apposite in the communications field-that
the Commission, which has extensive powers to deny a broadcaster the use
of the air altogether, has equally great power to restrain his use of it in a
way which Congress could constitutionally penalize. But it is suggested
that it is one thing to permit an agency to keep X broadcaster off the air,
and quite another thing to let X on, keep every other person off, and then
dictate to X in advance what he must not say.
But even if constitutional, regulation by cease-and-desist order is
entirely impracticable. In effect, a restraining order could accomplish
nothing. It must be remembered that what is in question is the matter of
deception. Once a broadcaster has been accused and adjudged guilty of
a particular deceptive practice at an administrative hearing-once the matter
has thus cogently been brought to the public attention-there will be no
need to order him to cease and desist. He will already have ceased-
witness the quiz shows-or the public will have stopped listening, or, if they
listen, they will not be deceived. If there is any reason to "regulate"
beyond the stage of revelation, it is not to prevent continuance of the par-
ticular activity in the future, but to punish that which has already occurred,
as a deterrent against the inauguration of other, as yet undisclosed, decep-
tions. In this aspect, cease-and-desist is a futility.
This leads consideration back to the question of criminal sanctions.
It was assumed arguendo above that Congress had power to enact them.
This seems questionable. Certainly criminal control of the contents of a
specific program broadcast cannot be justified on the basis of the selectivity-
in-the-public-interest theory which has traditionally underlain communica-
tions regulation. In view of the dubious nature of the harm involved, the
extremely difficult problem of definitions, and the ready and effective
availability of nonlegal sanctions if the public in fact comes to regard its
interests as offended, any inhibition of free expression by penal process in
the area would bear a heavy burden of justification under the first amend-
ment. And if constitutional, it is at best unwise.
Perhaps, if any legal control whatever is to be undertaken, the Com-
mission's suggestion of temporary suspension power vested in the FCC
is the most tolerable of the methods which have been proposed. The
great advantage of suspension proceedings would be to provide a forum
in which, under the protection of procedural safeguards, a record could be
made for disclosure to the public. Beyond this, suspension itself provides
a sanction not so severe as to be sure of nullification, yet severe enough to
have deterrent effect. Its limitations become most apparent in the situation
where the licensee who has been guilty of deceptive programming is the
only broadcaster serving a locality; here the Commission is unlikely to be
willing to put him off the air. But on the whole license-suspension enforce-
118 See JA=, op. cit. supra note 61, at 482.
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ment of an antideceptive programming policy articulated in advance by
rule-making would be free of the major disadvantages of the various other
procedures.
Even more acceptable might be a means of control which went no
further than to enable the public to decide for itself whether or not programs
employing "deception" are desirable. To this end, Congress might 'au-
thorize the FCC, after investigation and hearing concerning any particular
program practice, to issue regulations requiring broadcasters to announce,
at some time during the presentation, the procedures utilized to create the
entertainment effect. Individual enforcement could be by agency order,
and in the unlikely event of a refusal to comply, review of the regulation
could be had in the courts. Control, if exercised in this manner, would
create no loss of entertainment value in situations such as dramatic presenta-
tions where audiences are willing temporarily to suspend their power of
disbelief. Where disclosure destroys entertainment value it will be because
the public has been offered a form of entertainment which it is unwilling
to accept. Disclosure would merely provide the public with the power of
informed selection which was denied it by broadcasters in their past em-
ployment of "deception." Because this type of regulation is more flexible
and less drastic than previously suggested means and because it limits the
FCC's role to one of securing illumination to the public in the service of
the public's ability to choose, it offers perhaps the most practical and also
the least objectionable solution. Since this procedure, while imposing a
duty to disclose, would not limit the broadcaster's freedom to employ any
production device which he could make popularly acceptable, it should meet
with little or no objection in terms of first amendment principles.
Concentration on any policy making broadcasters responsible for
program contents at the source suggests that, beyond the questions of
whether and how to regulate, there remains the question of whom to regu-
late. It is to this issue primarily that the recommendations of the Sub-
committee on Legislative Oversight address themselves.11 9 In brief, the
subcommittee has proposed that networks as well as local broadcasting sta-
tions, be subjected to the FCC's licensing authority. This suggestion is
coupled with a proposal of definite guidelines for FCC consideration of
network activity, one of which would be an insistence that networks do not
surrender control over the material broadcast to producers. The scheme
is conceived in recognition of the fact that local television broadcasters
have accepted the networks as the source of most programs, and upon the
premise that if governmental control over program deception is to be
effective it should be directed at the organizations in the best position to
handle the practice, and should operate by making those organizations
responsible.
The proposals of the legislative subcommittee have at first blush the
cogency of a scheme which seeks to reconcile law to fact. It is true that in
119 The interim report of the subcommittee is printed in N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1960,
p. 62, col. 1.
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the TV field today there is an extreme concentration of program control
in the three nation-wide networks, 120 and that the networks themselves
have in significant measure relinquished control of programming to inde-
pendent producers,'12 1 so that the regulatory structure of the Communica-
tions Act, predicated upon FCC control of the local station-owner, in fact
leaves most of the decision-makers out of the jurisdiction of the agency. 122
But concealed in this proposition of adaptation to fact is a significant deci-
sion of policy-and one, it should be noted, which runs somewhat counter
to the policy of the Chain Broadcasting Regulations sustained in NBC.
The two policies are superficially similar in that they both "control" the
networks. But the phrase is ambiguous. In lieu of the exercise of public
authority directed only at forcing diversification of private power over
communications content the subcommittee's proposal would emphasize
primarily a scheme of concentrated private power held responsible to
concentrated public power. That scheme may be a wise policy decision.
It may be an unwise one. At the least it is one of enormous significance
and potential impact upon areas of communications far more vital both to
"public interest" and to "freedom of expression" than is deceptive pro-
gramming. It is certainly a policy decision to be taken only after mature
consideration of all of the consequences-economic, cultural, political-
which it may entail, not one to be rushed into headlong under the impetus of
a slight indignation over quiz shows. If the Communications Act of 1934
is ripe for reappraisal, it should be thoughtfully reappraised. To place at
the forefront of this reappraisal the problem of program deception would
be to allow an obsession with peccadilloes to obscure fundamental questions
in the allocation of social and political power.'
23
L.S.T.
120 In mid-1956, for example, only 35 of the then existing 431 commercial tele-
vision stations were without network affiliation. H.R. REP,. No. 1297, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 42 (1958). This affiliation apparently is essential for the profitable operation
of local stations, as it affords them a daily program fare of higher caliber than they
could produce independently, enabling them to appeal to a larger audience. Id. at 46.
121 It has been stated that NBC produces only 40% of the television shows which
it offers to the public, and that the percentages for the other two networks are less:
30% for CBS and 5% for ABC. Pressure put on the networks in 1956 by the
Department of Justice to give independent producers more access to broadcast time
has been suggested as a reason for this control by outside producers over network
programming. Time, Nov. 16, 1959, p. 78. Cf. Package Programs, Inc. v. Westing-
house Broadcasting Co., 255 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1958).
' 22 It is true that the FCC can exercise some control over the networks indirectly
through local broadcasters, and more directly by pressure upon them in their capacity
as station owners. In 1957, NBC owned 7, CBS 6, and ABC 5 local stations respec-
tively. NBC, in 1954, had owned 5 UHF television stations, located in New York
City, Chicago, Los Angeles, Cleveland and Washington, D.C. It later acquired a
Philadelphia station from Westinghouse in exchange for its Cleveland station and
$3,000,000. See United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 335-36 (1959).
123 An article by Mr. Whitney North Seymour, published while this Note is in
press, has just taken a very similar position. Seymour, Authority of the FCC Over
Broadcast Content, 4 J. BROADCASTING 18 (1960).
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